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Price efficiency in the Dutch Annuity Market 
Abstract 
We provide the first analysis of annuity rates in the Netherlands for the period 
2001-2012.  During this period, the number of annuity providers was high and 
stable and we find that falls in annuity rates can be explained entirely by changes 
in yields and life expectancy.  We show that annuitants could have increased their 
annuity income by about 5%, by shopping around and purchasing their annuities 
from alternative providers.  Money’s worth calculations show that the market is 
efficient by international standards, with a money’s worth above 0.9 for the whole 
period and close to unity by the end of the period. We present conflicting 
evidence on the existence of adverse selection because although we find money’s 
worths are inversely related to age of purchase, we find they are positively related 
to size of purchase.  
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Introduction 
Annuity markets around the world are playing a growing rôle in pension provision 
as defined-contribution personal pension systems are introduced and mature 
(World Bank, 1994; Holzman and Hinz, 2005; European Commission, 2009).   In 
the UK, defined contribution pensions with compulsory annuitization are likely to 
replace occupational defined benefit pension schemes altogether in the next few 
decades (Pensions Commission, 2004, chapter 3) and large annuity markets such 
as those in the UK and Chile have been analysed extensively (e.g. Cannon and 
Tonks, 2011; Ruiz and Mitchell, 2011).  In much of continental Europe, however, 
generous public pensions are likely to dominate pension provision for a significant 
period and defined contribution pensions are being introduced to complement 
existing pension schemes (and to compensate for existing schemes being less 
generous).  For example, Germany has a small voluntary annuities market 
(Kaschützke and Maurer, 2011) but DC schemes are growing due to the Riester 
reforms of 2001 (Schnabel, 2004).  In Italy the TFR reforms of 2004 have resulted 
in the birth of a small DC pension system with compulsory annuitization of at 
least part of the pension wealth on retirement (Aben, 2011; Rinaldi, 2011) and there 
is continued discussion about how the annuitization option could be improved 
(Paci et al, 2010).  Holzmann and Hinz (2005) describe how many countries in 
central and eastern Europe introduced defined contribution pensions to 
complement existing state pensions after the collapse of communism. 
Despite theoretical reasons for believing that annuities can be utility enhancing 
(Yaari, 1965; Sheshinski, 2008), it is well known result that where annuities are 
purchased voluntarily the market tends to be small (Brown et al, 2001).  Cannon 
and Tonks (2008) suggest that plausible reasons for this market failure are either 
that adverse selection prevents a market equilibrium or that individuals do not 
fully understand how an annuity works (since annuity purchase is a once-and-for-
all decision there is no opportunity for agents to learn about the product).  A 
possible solution to these problems is to make annuitization compulsory, 
preventing moral hazard, namely individuals deliberately falling back on state 
benefits, and is a reasonable quid pro quo for tax relief which has been received in 
the accumulation phase.  However, compulsion does not remove all problems and 
may create additional ones if the market is imperfect (Mackenzie, 2006). 
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Nearly all of these analyses accept that the annuity decision depends upon the 
institutional details of the annuity market and other features of the pensions 
system.  A corollary of this is that studies of different annuity markets allow 
economists to get a better idea of what is likely to work in practice and in different 
contexts. Mitchell, Piggott and Takayama (2011) survey ten countries’ annuity 
markets in various stages of development. They draw a distinction between 
countries with compulsory annuitization (UK, Sweden), countries with mandatory 
accumulation plans but without compulsory annuitization (Australia, Chile, 
Switzerland), and other countries in which retirement income depends on 
traditional social security in which the annuity market is small (Germany, Japan). 
The Dutch system lies between these, with a pay-as-you-go first pillar and a well-
established mandatory occupational second pillar, much like Switzerland (Bütler, 
2009), but with only a small annuity market more like Germany (Kaschützke and 
Maurer, 2011), even though in the Netherlands annuitization of the small DC 
pension market is compulsory. Life insurers providing DC pensions and annuities, 
are also typically involved with the management of the occupational second pillar, 
so that even though the annuity market is small, these providers will have a 
sufficient large pool to make idiosyncratic longevity risk negligible.  
In this paper we provide the first empirical analysis of prices in the Dutch annuity 
market.1  Although this market is growing, it is currently a good example of a small 
mature annuity market existing alongside a large defined benefit public and 
occupational pension system. As with the UK, annuitization of personal pensions 
is compulsory, although participation in a personal pension is voluntary, making it 
more similar to the system enacted in Italy from 2004  In section 1 we introduce 
the Dutch pension system and describe the institutional and qualitative features of 
the annuity market.  Section 2 reports annuity price data for the Netherlands in 
the last decade and section 3 reports our money’s worth calculations.  
                                                 
1
 For Dutch attitudes to pension provision and annuitisation see Alessi, van Rooij and Lusardi 
(2011) and Teppa (2011). 
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1. Description of the Dutch Annuity Market 
The Netherlands has a three-pillar pension system. Pensions in the Netherlands 
are financed by a PAYG scheme for the state pension and capital-based schemes 
for the mandatory occupational pension and voluntary retirement savings. The 
aim of many employees is to have a gross replacement rate at retirement of 
approximately 70 per cent, which is approximately a net replacement rate of 90 
per cent due to tax incentives. The Dutch have a long history in saving for 
retirement, with the first private pension funds founded in the nineteenth century.  
The first pillar is the state pension (General Old Age Pension Act, or AOW) with a 
yearly premium income of €21 billion in 2011, financed on a Pay As You Go basis. 
Eligibility for benefits is based on residence and is independent of working history. 
After living in the Netherlands for 50 years (between age 15 and 65) every citizen 
receives a full state pension (€1,501 per month for couples and €1,085 per month 
for individuals in 2013).2  The retirement age is due to increase gradually to 66 by 
2019 and 67 by 2023.3 
The second pillar is the mandatory collective occupational pension scheme, which 
is based on work history. This second pillar is funded. The yearly premium income 
of pension funds was €30 billion in 2009 and in 2010 there were a total of 514 
pension funds. Pension funds can either manage the pension fund and portfolio 
management themselves or contract it out to an external implementing body, 
usually a specialized pension scheme administrator or an insurer. In 2010, 93 per 
cent of pension fund members belonged to a defined benefit pension scheme. 
Only 4.5 per cent of members had a defined contribution scheme and 2.3 per cent 
of members had a combination of a defined benefit and a defined contribution 
plan. Dutch law prohibits the commutation of pension entitlements, except for 
small entitlements (€417 per annum in 2009) which is due to the relative high 
administrative cost associated with it.  Members in DC pension plans are required 
to use their DC pension capital to purchase annuities, i.e., a lump sum withdrawal 
is not allowed.  
                                                 
2
 http://www.svb.nl/int/en/aow/hoogte_aow/bedragen/index.jsp 
3
 http://www.pensioenkijker.nl/home/aow-anw/verhoging-aow-leeftijd. There are further 
proposals to bring these changes forward to 2018 and 2021.  
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The third pillar is voluntary pension insurance, mainly provided through insurers, 
although since 2008 tax-exempt accrual pension saving has also been possible 
through a bank, called “banksparen”.4  Individuals purchase a capital sum insured 
before retirement and then convert this to an annuity upon retirement. In the last 
years of the past decade some of the capital sum insured products received 
negative press coverage because of high costs, especially for the included 
insurance components. After public and political pressure the insurers reached an 
agreement with the insured to pay back the excessive fees which had been 
charged.  Another noteworthy change was the introduction of the tax favoured 
“Levensloop” scheme in the Netherlands in 2005. This scheme allowed for a 
reduction in savings during periods of low income arising from being in education 
or having to take care of one’s dependant, etc. Although indented otherwise, in 
practice it was mainly used to finance early retirement through this scheme, which 
led to regulatory changes to the scheme to reduce that possibility in 2012. Those 
schemes were mainly managed by pension funds. 
Life insurance companies play a rôle in the Dutch pension system in both the 
second and the third pillar. Insurance companies manage approximately 20 per 
cent of the pension contracts. The third pillar has been managed by insurers only. 
The yearly gross life insurance premium income is given in Figure 1.1., and has 
been around €25 billion during the past decade.  
Figure 1.1 about here 
Of the €21 billion gross direct life premium business income around €15 billion was 
from individual policies, and around €6 billion was from group policies. These 
group policies are mainly due to the management of second pillar pensions. 
Although the total value of the annuities is almost €36 billion (about four per cent 
of GDP), it is much smaller than the total sum of capital sum insured, which was 
€658 billion in 2009. Over €29 billion of the annuities are in group insured 
contracts, of which 44 per cent is unit-linked and 56 per cent is euro insurance. 
For individual contracts the value of the annuities was over €6 billion Euros in 
                                                 
4
 Article 1.7 Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001 (income tax law 2001) is applicable to pension decumulation 
via banksparen and via insurance products. The law mandates that an individual should purchases 
a product which provides a lifelong income with certain constraints on the level of payments. For 
banksparen, because it has no insurance element in it, this lifelong income has been interpreted 
as an income for at least 20 years. . 
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2009, of which only 11 per cent was unit-linked, the other 89 per cent was euro 
insurance. 
The Dutch life insurance market is dominated by 6-8 insurance concerns, which 
have a market share of around 85 per cent. Figure 1.2 illustrates the market share 
of the premium income of the largest insurance concerns during 2002-2007. 
During that period there have been two mergers between large insurance 
concerns, namely in 2004 the insurance part of Rabobank merged with Achmea to 
form Eureko and in 2007 SNS Reaal took over SwissLife. Aside from these mergers, 
the fluctuations in the share of premium income do not fluctuate too much. 
Figure 1.2 about here   
In Figure 1.3 the distribution of the market share of premium income of the top 25 
life insurance companies in the Netherlands is given from 2002 to 2009. From this 
we see that the top 10 life insurance companies have 70-80 per cent of the market 
share and the top 25 have a combined market share of 88-94 per cent. Moreover, 
we see that the market share is becoming more concentrated, suggesting the 
possibility of increased market power.  
Figure 1.3 about here 
2. Description of Annuity Price Data 
All of the annuity prices we analyse here are from the Dutch compulsory purchase 
market and are for men only (data for women are unavailable).  The data were 
provided by Money View, which is an organisation collecting annuity rates for 
price comparisons. (see http://www.moneyview.nl/).  Annuity prices are reported 
for a total of 32 different named companies throughout the period, but because 
some of the companies merged or changed name the total number of actual 
companies is only 28 and one of these (Univé) only quoted for a short period: the 
total number of price quotes that we have is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 about here 
For each firm we have data on purchase prices for men aged 60 and 65 for 
amounts of €50,000 and €125,000.  There are two small structural breaks in 2002 
and 2010: before 2002 the annuity rates were for purchase prices in Dutch 
Guilders, with purchase prices of ƒ100,000 (€45,378 given an exchange rate of 
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2.20371) and ƒ250,000 (€113,445); in mid-2010 the annuity rates change from 
annuities paying quarterly to annuities paying monthly.  Annuity rates are 
conventionally defined as the annual payment relative to the purchase price and 
so we use the relevant definitions that 
(1) 
4
12
quarterly annuity payment up to July 2010
annuity purchase price
annuity rate
monthly annuity payment from August 2010
annuity purchase price



 
 


 
The annuity rates before and after the two potential structural breaks are almost 
identical, so we do not make further adjustments. 
Many life insurance company quotes two prices, an internal price for annuitants 
who have also saved their pension fund with the company (called “maatschappĳ”) 
and another external price for annuitants who are transferring their pension fund 
from another company (called “elders”).  With annuity prices for two ages, two 
purchase prices and two types of purchase this means that we have eight annuity 
prices per firm.  
Figure 2.2 about here 
Annuity rates for internal purchase for a 65-year old man with a purchase price of 
€50,000 are illustrated in Figure 2.2; the analogous annuity rate for a 60-year old 
man is almost identical except for being about one percentage point lower.5   
Two issues are how annuity rates depend upon the purchase price and 
internal/external purchase.  For each firm we calculate the ratio of the larger  
purchase price to the smaller and the ratio of the internal to the external purchase 
price and we summarise the corresponding ratios in Figure 2.3.  The dashed lines 
show the average ratio across all firms: for the whole period a larger purchase 
price typically results in an annuity rate about one per cent higher (not one 
percentage point) with a similar but smaller effect for internal versus external 
purchase.  However, until about 2005, some firms offered much higher annuity 
rates for larger purchase prices or for internal purchase.  After this time, however, 
the variation in annuity rate by purchase price became much smaller.  This 
                                                 
5
 Figures for 60-year olds and figures containing other information can be found in the Appendix.   
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appears to be due to the opening of the pension administrator market to other 
European institutes. The IORP directive (2003/41/EG), accepted in the European 
Parliament in June 2003 and had to be implemented before 23 September 2005, 
resulted in the “Pensioen en Spaarfondsenwet” at 8 February 2006.  This led to an 
increase in competition between the pensions administrators. 
Figure 2.3 about here 
From Figure 2.2 it can be seen that the range of annuity rates on offer at any point 
in time was about one percentage point, suggesting that the difference between 
the best and worst pension income available was quite significant: an annuitant at 
the company with the lowest annuity rate would have had a pension income up to 
one-sixth higher if they had been at the company offering the best annuity rate, 
translating into a difference of €1,250 per year for the larger purchase price.   Of 
course, to move to another annuity provider would have meant facing the external 
price rather than the internal price.  For a 65-year old with an annuity purchase of 
€50,000 the average benefit over the period from moving company would be €202 
per year on a pension income of €4,159; for a corresponding annuitant with an 
annuity purchase of €125,000 the increase would be €488 on an income of €10,494.  
This suggests that there are significant benefits from moving company for many 
annuitants. 
We do not have data on the volume of business transacted by the different 
companies, so we are unable to calculate a weighted average of annuity rates.  The 
fact that firms frequently change rates is prima facie evidence of competition.    
There are two further indirect ways that we can judge the competitiveness of the 
Dutch annuity market.   
One measure of the competitiveness of a market is the proportion of time that 
individual firms’ annuity rates are high or low compared to the market as a whole.  
If the relative prices of different firms never changed then that might be taken as 
evidence that the market was sclerotic, since firms would never be attempting to 
improve their relative position.  Our chosen measure of a firm’s relative price is 
the quartile of prices that the firm’s price is in at a given point in time.  Figure 2.4 
shows the proportion of the time that companies were at different points in the 
ranking of annuity rates (companies with very few observations were omitted and 
companies involved in mergers, takeovers or name changes were treated as one 
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company).  The firms are ranked by how often they are in the top five: since some 
companies leave the industry they sometimes have no ranking  The most 
competitive firm  (on the left of the diagram) had a top-five annuity rate in the top 
for about 63 per cent of the time, but it withdrew from the market altogether in 
2011.  Clearly some firms were consistently at the top or the bottom of the 
distribution.  However, in the middle of the diagram there are a number of firms 
whose position changes considerably over the period: a jostling for position which 
may be indicative of competitive behaviour.  With the exception of firm 1, firms 
with annuity rates that were poor value tended to drop out of the market.  
Figure 2.4 about here 
Another measure of competition is the extent to which firms offer better annuity 
rates to annuitants coming from other companies (external purchase or “elders 
expirerend kapitaal”), which we have already illustrated in Figure 2.3.  Since the 
internal rates tend to be higher than the external rates, this is evidence against 
firms competing for additional purchases. 
3. Money’s Worth Calculations 
A key determinant of the annuity rate, especially when considering short run 
movements in annuity rates, is the interest rate.  Formally the annuity rate should 
be compared to the whole term structure of interest rates, since it consists of 
contingent payments made at a variety of points in the future.  However, for a first 
look at the data we compare the annuity rate to the ten-year government bond 
yield, with data on Dutch long-term interest rates taken from Bloomberg.  The 
Bloomberg data is based on interest rate swaps which provide a good indicator of 
the hypothetical yield on a pure discount bond issued by the Dutch government.  
Unfortunately these data are available for only two isolated observations in the 
first few years, so we supplement our data with yields based on ten-year coupon 
bearing bonds: where a comparison is possible the swap rate is a bit higher.  We 
graph the data for long-term interest rates and selected annuity rates in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 about here 
The difference between the annuity rate for 60-year olds and the ten-year bond 
yield is fairly constant at about 3 percentage points.  This is unsurprising: interest 
rates do not change a huge amount over the period and we should not expect large 
11 
 
increases in life expectancy over the relatively short period of ten years.  The 
sudden drop in yields in the autumn of 2010 coincides with a sudden drop in 
annuity rates at the same time, so the co-movement is strong at high frequencies. 
Apart from data availability, our justification for using the swap curve is based on 
the regulatory framework in the Netherlands, which is described in Actuariel 
Genootschap and Actuarieel Instituut (2009).  From about 2003 the swap curve 
became the official yield curve for valuation of pension fund liabilities under 
Section 126(2)(a) of the Pension Act.  This was because the swap market was 
highly liquid and rates on swaps were only marginally higher than those on Dutch 
government bonds (typically 0.1 to 0.2 per cent), resulting in a consensus between 
the financial regulator and the insurers to use this curve.  However, AG&AI (2009) 
argue that the financial crisis at the end of 2008 led to the swap curve becoming 
unreliable.  Premia on swaps relative to the government curve became highly 
variable (daily movements of up to 0.5 per cent) and deficient supply of long-dated 
swaps led to swap yields being lower than bond yields (AG&AI, 2009, Figure 2, 
suggests the implied yield on swaps was 0.75 per cent lower than on bonds at a 
term of thirty years).  For this reason the Dutch Central Bank allowed firms to use 
alternative discount factors from 2009 onwards. 
A formal comparison of annuity rates requires the use of the money’s worth, which 
compares the expected present value of the annuity payments to the purchase 
price.   The money’s worth is defined as: 
(2)      ,
1
|t x t t t
i
MW A x R i S x i x


   
where t is the date at which the money’s worth is being measured, x is the age of 
the annuitant,  tA x  is the annuity rate,  tR i  is the discount factor (taken from 
the yield curve) relevant at time t for a payment at period t + i, and  |tS x i x  is 
the probability that someone alive at age x in period t will live another i periods. 
In our analysis we use survival probabilities based both on data for the population 
as a whole and also for pensioners (who are a select group).  In each case survival 
probabilities are based upon predicted one-year death probabilities from the 
formula  
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(3)     
1
| 1
i
t t j
j
S x i x q x j

     
where  t jq x j   is the probability of someone aged x + j in period t + j dying in 
that period (equivalently, the probability that someone aged x in period t who 
survives to period t +j then dying in that period).  Since survival probabilities are a 
non-linear function of the mortality, the expected survival probability is not quite 
the same as the survival probability calculated from the expected mortalities 
(Cannon, 2009), but we follow standard actuarial practice in ignoring this issue.  
To calculate the money’s worth we need to evaluate equation (3) using the best 
information available at time t but retrospectively it is not always clear precisely 
when new data became available, nor how life assurance companies adjusted 
publicly available information in the light of their own mortality experience.  
One possible indicator of the survival probabilities we should use is the fact that 
the Money View data include an internal rate of return calculation to evaluate 
annuities (called the “effectieve rendement”), which is based on population 
mortality tables GBM9500 (Actuarieel Genootschap, 2002), which is a simple 
period life table, so that the money’s worth is calculated using  
(4)     
1
| 1
i
P
t
j
S x i x q x j

     
where  q x j   is the one-year death probability for someone aged x + j in period 
t (not period t + j) and the super-script P emphasises that this is thus a period 
table.  On this basis the life expectancy for a 60-year old man would be 78 years, 8 
months; the life expectancy for a 75-year old man would be 79 years, 10 months.  
Our hard copy of the GBM9500 table is dated March 2002, although life assurers 
may have started using this table before or after that date.  On the basis of an 
international survey, Watson-Wyatt (2006) reports that defined-benefit pension 
schemes were still using this table at the end of 2005.  This is some anecdotal 
evidence that this is the appropriate table, at least for the beginning of the period 
under consideration.  In Figure 3.2 we report our money’s worth calculations based 
on this population table.  The money’s worth has declined over the period, 
although, some of the apparent decline is due to using different interest rate data 
early on: recall that we have only two observations of yield data from swaps for the 
period 2001-2003, which are denoted by the black squares in the figure. 
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Figure 3.2 about here 
Recall that the money’s worth is the ratio of the expected present value of the 
payouts compared to the purchase price, so in a utopian world the money’s worth 
would equal one.   In fact the money’s worth should be less than this, both 
because there are real costs to providing annuities and annuity providers must 
provide reserves to allow for the possibility that mortality might fall faster  than 
expected.  In addition the results in Figure 3.2 are subject to two additional 
problems: they are biased down because we have not taken into account the 
likelihood of mortality improvements; and they are biased down because 
annuitant life expectancy is likely to be longer than population life expectancy: 
annuitants tend to have a higher life expectancy than the population, since 
individuals with a pension tend to be richer and healthier than average.  
Figure 3.3 about here 
In Figure 3.3 we use alternative one-year death probabilities which take account of 
projected increases in life expectancy.  The first set of death probabilities are taken 
from the CBS 2000 Statistics Netherland table.  This table is based upon 
population mortality but has official projections of death probabilities for years 
2001-2049.  We cannot say with certainty when the information in any of the life 
tables became available to life insurers (note that life insurers have private 
information on their own pensioners which is available earlier than official 
publications) and so use rough guesses.  There was very little change between the 
CBS 2000, CBS 2002 and CBS 2004 tables and so the calculated money’s worths are 
nearly the same for all three tables.  Compared to the GBM9500 table the money’s 
worths are about five percentage points higher, due to the incorporation of 
mortality improvements. 
The money’s worth is initially in the range 0.95 to 1.0, declining to between 0.90 to 
0.93 in 2004-6.  However, using updated mortality table CBS 2006 the money’s 
worth rises to 0.95 and the switch to CBS 2008 results in a further rise of the 
money’s worth to about (or even above) unity.  These results are similar to those 
of Cannon and Tonks (2013), where apparent falls in the money’s worth based on a 
particular life table are then revealed to be due to increases in projected life 
expectancy when a revised life table is published.  Furthermore, the fall in the 
money’s worth almost invariably anticipates the publication of the new table, 
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suggesting that life insurers’ annuity pricing is based on private information which 
arrives earlier than publication of official data. 
The final life table that we use is labelled GP 2008, which is based on CBS 2008 
with explicit adjustments to allow for longer life expectancy of pensioners than the 
whole population.  Using this life table the money’s worth is substantially above 
one, averaging 1.04 and with a maximum of 1.06, suggesting that life insurers are 
making a loss.  There are two possible explanations for this.  First, life insurers 
may be able to earn higher rates of return than on government bonds, perhaps 
because they are holding corporate bonds, in which case we would be using too 
low a discount rate in calculating the money’s worth.  As an ad hoc approach to 
this problem, we re-calculate the money’s worth with a discount rates 0.5 per cent 
higher.  This would result in the average money’s worth for this period falling to 
an average of 0.99, with a maximum value of 1.01.  Although this still seems very 
high, James and Song (2001) note that many countries have high money’s worths 
for annuity products.  James and Song (2001) hypothesise that this is due to firms 
being able to arbitrage risk by holding risky assets (corporate bonds or even 
equity) against less risky annuity liabilities and recover the risk premium as profit.  
This is consistent with regulatory constraints if annuity providers have sufficiently 
large and diversified portfolios. 
Alternatively it may be that insurance companies sell annuities as a loss and cross 
subsidise the product from profits earned in the accumulation phase of the private 
pension.  This would be consistent with many firms offering lower annuity rates to 
external purchase as firms would only wish to cross-subsidise existing customers. 
To see the effect of purchase price and age on the money’s worth we report annual 
average money’s worths in Table 3.1: to save space we only include calculations for 
selected years and we omit calculations for the CBS 2002 and 2004 tables (as they  
are almost identical to CBS 2000).  The money’s worth of an annuity purchase 
price €125,000 is about one per cent higher than for €50,000, which follows 
directly from the fact that annuity rates are about one per cent higher for the 
larger purchase prices as illustrated in Figure 2.3.  The money’s worth for 60-year 
olds is always higher than for 65-year olds, but rarely by more than one per cent, 
consistent with what Cannon and Tonks (2008) report for the UK, but inconsistent 
with other results where money’s worth declines significantly with age (e.g. 
Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002). 
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Table 3.1 about here 
Summary and Discussion 
In this paper we have described the workings of annuity markets in the 
Netherlands and analysed the pricing of annuity products.  Unlike the markets in 
Germany and Switzerland but like the UK, the Dutch market is a compulsory 
market in that pension wealth must be annuitized.  Unlike the UK market, the 
Dutch market complements a large funded occupational pension sector and a 
relatively generous first-pillar pay-as-you-go state pension.  The Dutch market is 
not very large but it is mature and within the context of a large and modern 
financial sector. 
Annuities are purchased out of individual pension funds from life insurance 
companies and pensioners have the option to move their fund from the company 
with which the fund was accumulated to an alternative company (an external 
purchase).  Our analysis of prices shows that companies do not offer higher rates 
to external purchases and so do not appear to be actively competing for business, 
although there is enough inter-company variation in prices that some pensioners 
would benefit by moving to a different annuity provider: on average a 65-year old 
with a pension fund of only €50,000 could still benefit by about €200 per year by 
moving to the provider with the highest external annuity rate.  
Annuity rates move over time with the long-term government bond yield and are 
typically four percentage points higher.  A formal evaluation of annuity rates  using 
money’s worth calculations depends upon the assumptions made about life 
expectancy.  Over the period 2002 to 2010 projected life expectancy for a Dutch 65-
year old male has risen from 15 years and 11 months to 18 years and 4 months, an 
increase of almost two-and-a-half years, or a 15 per cent increase in the amount of 
annuity payments that would have to be made.  In addition to this, life expectancy 
of a 65-year old male pensioner is 11 months greater than for an average 65-year 
old male. 
Our money’s worth calculations suggest that Dutch annuities are fairly priced, 
with the money’s worth being above 0.9 for the entire period.  During the period 
2008 to 2010 the money’s worths appear to be greater than one.  This may be an 
artefact of using new mortality tables before they were used by Dutch annuity 
providers or it may be that Dutch insurance companies felt confident that they 
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could earn higher rates of return than on government bonds, consistent with 
explanations for high money’s worths suggested by James and Song (2001). 
Mitchell et al. (2011) report that MWs in Switzerland and Chile are high which in 
part explains the large size of the voluntary annuity market in these countries, 
though Bütler and Staubli (2011) also emphasise that behavioural factors – such as 
an emphasis on the consumption-frame (Brown et al., 2008) - are also important. 
In contrast, the market for annuities in Australia has disappeared, and Bateman 
and Piggott (2011) argue that this is in part due to a framing effect where f inancial 
advisors are incentivised to promote investment-style products. But high money’s 
worth does not guarantee a large demand for annuities. The voluntary markets in 
the UK (Cannon and Tonks, 2011), Sweden (Palmer and Larson, 2011) and Germany 
(Kaschützke and Maurer, 2011) are small even though the money’s worth of 
voluntary annuities in each of these countries is high. Our finding of high money’s 
worths in the Dutch annuity market is not surprising in light of this international 
evidence, though what is more surprising are the sudden jumps in the money’s 
worths when a new life-table is introduced for the second half of the period. We 
note from the time series patterns that annuity rates and interest rates are 
declining smoothly and move closely together. So any jumps in money’s worths 
with a new mortality table must be due to revised mortalities being lower. Cannon 
and Tonks (2008) suggest that as mortality improves, companies continuously 
update annuity rates, and so money’s worths calculated using a given table will 
appear to decline (because the researcher continues to use an old table);  following 
the introduction by the researcher of a new table reflecting lower mortalities, the 
money’s worth will jump up. For the Netherlands, however, although we observe 
this pattern for the switch from CBS 2004 to CBS 2006, in the case of the switch 
from CBS 2006 to CBS 2008 annuity rates, money’s worths do not decline in 
anticipation of the new table. Further, the money’s worth appears to increase after 
the introduction of the new table. This suggests that Dutch annuity providers 
failed to incorporate new mortality projections in a timely manner in 2008.  
We do not have data on a wide variety of annuity types, but what information we 
do have provides conflicting evidence for the existence of asymmetric information 
in the Dutch annuity market.   Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) suggest that the 
theory of adverse selection predicts money’s worths should be lower at higher ages 
and for larger purchases; on the basis that older persons have better estimates of 
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their own mortalities, and individuals who expect to live longer will annuitize a 
larger percentage of their pension wealth. Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) find this 
pattern for UK annuity rates in 1998, although time-series studies for Germany 
(Kaschütze and Maurer, 2011), for the UK (Cannon and Tonks, 2013) and for Chile 
(James et al, 2006) report a positive relationship between money’s worths and age.   
In these data for the Netherlands, we find that money’s worths are higher for 
larger purchases - in contrast to the adverse selection prediction; although we do 
find lower money’s worths for higher ages - supporting the asymmetric 
information assumption. So although these data do not allow us to perform 
powerful tests for adverse selection, what little evidence that they might provide is 
conflicting.  
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1.1: Yearly gross life insurance premium income.  
 
Source: Dutch insurance industry in figures, 2005-2011, Dutch Association of 
Insurers. 
Figure 1.2: Market share of the premium income of the largest insurance 
concerns.  
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Source: AM Insurance Magazine, Dutch Central Bank 
 
Figure 1.3: Market share of premium income of the top 25 life insurance 
companies.  
 
Source: Dutch insurance industry in figures, 2005-2011, Dutch Association of 
Insurers 
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Figure 2.1: Number of firms quoting an annuity rate.  
 
Figure 2.2: Annuity rates, Male 65, internal purchase (maatschappĳ): €50,000 
purchase price (annuity payments quarterly until 2010, thereafter monthly)  
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Figure 2.3: Comparisons of firms’ different annuity rates 
 
Figure 2.4: Firms’ competitiveness and survival 
Graph shows the proportion of time that a firm’s annuity rates were in a given 
position relative to the whole market. 
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of annuity rates and long-term interest rates.  
Source: authors’ calculations and Bloomberg. 
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Figure 3.2: Money’s worths based on constant GBM9500 mortality table. 
Calculations based on the Male 65, €125,000, average internal purchase. 
 
Figure 3.3: Money’s worths based on mortality tables with projected 
improvements in life expectancy.  
Calculations based on the Male 65, €125,000, average internal purchase . 
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Table 3.1 Annual average money’s worths using different mortality tables. 
  M60, €50,000 M65, €50,000 M60, €125,000  M65, €125,000 
CBS 2000 Life Table; Bond Yield Curve 
2002 0.939 0.930 0.950 0.940 
2003 0.975 0.966 0.988 0.976 
CBS 2000 Life Table; Swap Yield Curve 
2004 0.918 0.917 0.927 0.925 
2005 0.902 0.899 0.911 0.908 
CBS 2006 Life Table; Swap Yield Curve 
2006 0.946 0.943 0.956 0.952 
2007 0.954 0.951 0.963 0.960 
2008 0.956 0.952 0.965 0.960 
CBS 2008 Life Table; Swap Yield Curve 
2008 0.977 0.976 0.987 0.985 
2009 1.008 1.005 1.018 1.014 
GP 2008 Life Table; Swap Yield Curve 
2008 1.012 1.011 1.021 1.019 
2009 1.043 1.039 1.053 1.048 
2010 1.043 1.040 1.054 1.050 
2011 0.980 0.980 0.993 0.991 
2012 0.954 0.954 0.966 0.964 
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